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Aceh emerges from years of st·ate terror 
After nearly a decade of brutality, massacres, disappearances and rape, the people of Aceh have spo-
ken out about their sufferings at the hands of Indonesian troops, forcing the ABRI commander to 
make a public. apology. Although military, operational status will now end, the people want thou-
sands of disappearances and mass graves to be investigated, prosecution of the guilty men and com-
pensation for the victims or their families. 
The downfall of the Indooesian dictator, Suharto, on 21 
May opened the way for people .in Aceh to give vent to 
their anger at the murderous campaign of terror to which 
they have been subjected since the late 1980s and the deci-
sion by the Indonesian army in 1991 to treat Aceh as a 
military operational region or DOM. [See TAPOL Bulletin, 
No 147, July 1998 for an account of the opposition to 
DOM.} 
On 8 August, armed forces (ABRI) commander-in-
chief General Wiranto, made a hurried visit to Aceh to is-
sue a public apology to the people of the region. For 
weeks, local and national newspap.ers had been awash with 
the horrific testimony of hundreds of Acehnese to members 
of a parliamentary fact-finding mission to the province. It 
was clear that, with ABRI's reputation under severe strain 
over abductions of human rights activists (see separate 
item), speedy action was needed to salvage its reputation in 
the country's most northerly province. 
Wiranto announced that DOM would be lifted and that 
all 'non-organic' troops would be withdrawn from Aceh 
within a month. These are mainly elite corps KOPASSUS 
troops. He also said that Acehnese who had fled abroad 
during the reign of terror could return, promising that un-
less they were involved in 'criminal activities', they would 
not be prosecuted. He also said that the term GPK, 
Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan or 'security disruptor 
gangs', would be scrapped and replaced by GPL, for 
Gerakan Pengacau Liar or 'wild disruptor gangs', as the 
way to refer to the Free Aceh Movement, which has been 
struggling since the mid 1970s for liberation from Indone-
sia. The GPK initials are used to brand liberation struggles 
in Aceh, West Papua and East Timor as terrorist groupings. 
Replacing one of the letters makes not a scrap of differ-
ence. 
Background to state terror in Aceh 
The story of Aceh in post-colonial Indonesia is one of 
rebellious opposition to Jakarta. In the early 1950s, when 
the position of the ulama or religious teachers was very 
strong, a rebellion broke out under the banner of Darul 
Islam. After years of conflict, the rebellion was finally 
subdued in 1959 with the granting of 'special status'. Two 
years earlier, Aceh had became a separate province. Spe-
cial status accordecj it autonomy in religion, customary law 
and education. According to Tim Kell, this left Aceh insu-
lated from external influences for nearly a decade until the 
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dramatic political changes in Indonesia after Suharto took 
power in 1965. [See The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 
1989-1992, Cornell, 1995, page 12.] 
Under the New Order, Aceh's natural resources, in par-
ticular its liquefied natural gas, were exploited on a mas-
sive scale. LNG produced by the Arun liquefied gas plant, 
became a major foreign exchange earner; by the 1980s In-
donesia was supplying 40 per cent of the world's supplies. 
A large fertiliser plant was built, almost entirely for export, 
alongside the Kertas Kraft Aceh factory producing sacks 
for the country's rapidly growing cement industry. 
Virtually all the proceeds from these and other huge in-
vestments went to the centre, not to speak of jobs which 
were taken by people from outside the region. Aceh con-
tributes eleven per cent to the national budget, but receives 
hardly one per cent in return. Observers speak of 'rich 
ghettos of migrants' and the emergence of glaring social 
and cultural disparities between those employed by the big 
industries and the surrounding population, (Kell, page 17-
18). Moreover, as centralisation intensified under Suharto, 
Aceh's special status, limited as it was, became meaning-
less . 
ABRI soldiers posing by the body of a murdered GAM warrior 
In 1976, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) under Hasan 
di Tiro, the descendant of one of Aceh's leading noble 
families, proclaimed independence and initiated an armed 
struggle. The movement, also known as the Acheh/Sumatra 
National Liberation Front, sustained the struggle for sev-
eral years but was effectively quelled, only to resume its 
struggle in 1989, with far wider support from the local 
population, and better trained and equipped forces. 
The army . was forced onto the defensive with many 
army and police posts bein~ taken out' by GAM forces. 
Senior army officers made no secret of their isolation in 
many parts of the province, with officers and soldiers pre-
ferring to wear civilian clothing to conceal their identity 
from a largely hostile population. In May 1990, the Aceh 
district military commander, Colonel Sofian, while denying 
'groundless reports' in the Indonesian press that civilians 
had been killed, said that security was vital because there 
were five major industries in the region. 'We don't want to 
take any risks since there are many vital projects and many 
foreign nationals work here.' [Jakarta Post, 14 May 1990 
quoted in TAPOL Bulletin No 99, June 1990] According 
to Kompas [9 July 1990] an estimated fifty military and 
civilians had been killed in the previous weeks. 
Local support for GAM was clearly widespread, _ac-
cording to reports from many sources. In mid-1991, M~Jor­
General Pramono was lamenting the fact that the guernllas 
were 'everywhere among the people' and 'had a concept, 
had guns and on the ground, had the masses ' (see Kell 
page 66-67). The army also were worried that the insur-
gents enjoyed support among the educated elite; a number 
of academics were later put on trial for supporting the 
armed struggle and given particularly harsh sentences. 
These men are still in prison today. 
In 1991, as the pressure on GAM intensified, it appears 
that some of their leading figures succeeded in escaping to 
Malaysia, along with hundreds of civilians fleeing the ter-
ror in the countryside. Although by 1992, GAM forces 
were probably greatly reduced in number, the reign ofter-
ror continued unabated. 
After years without news of conditions in Aceh, TA-
POL received a detailed report from the region, describing 
Aceh as a virtual war zone, with a huge influx of troops 
into Pidie district and villagers again being forced to take 
part in 'fence oflegs' operations to flush out the guerrillas. 
[See TAPOL Bulletin, No 143, October 1997.] 
Killer KOPASSUS troops .sent in 
· Back in June 1990, the army's special elite strike force, 
KOP ASSUS, was sent to the area 'to hunt down Free Aceh 
forces'. [TAPOL Bulletin No 99, July 1990.] This is the 
force which, according to all the evidence now coming to 
light, has spearheaded the wave of terror against the popu-
lation. 
In an interview with Tempo, the North Sumatra military 
commander, Major-General H.R Pramono, himself from 
the elite force, admitted that people were being killed every 
day in Aceh. He urged people to kill anyone suspected of 
being a GPK supporter: 
'I have told people the important thing, if you see a 
GP K, you should kill him. There 's no need to investigate, 
just shoot him or knife him .... I have instructed people to 
carry weapons, machetes or whatever. If you see a GPK, 
just kill him! [Tempo, 17 November, 1990, quoted in TA-
POL Bulletin, No 103, February 1991.] 
These murderous instructions were to set the tone for 
Aceh' s experience for the next decade. 
According to a dossier full of horrifying atrocities, sent 
to T APOL at the time by the Aceh/Sumatra National Lib-
eration Front, 56 prisoners being held at the notorious Ran-
cong detention centre in Lhokseumawe, were stripped na-
ked, shot dead and their bodies thrown down a ravine, 
where they were found by villagers three days later, most 
of_ them u?identifiable. The dossier described prisoners 
bemg held m barbed-wire cells with their hands tied behind 
their backs. One form of torture was to unleash dogs on the 
prisoners, which resulted in some being savaged to death. 
[TAPOL Bulletin, No 102, December 1990] 
A New York-based Asia Watch report on 27 December 
1990 quoted an army doctor as estimating a thousand 
deaths on both sides, with perhaps more killed by summary 
executions than in actual armed clashes. It spoke of bodies 
~ith gun~hot or st~b v:oun~s 'being. found by roads, along 
nvers or m pl~ntat1ons , wh_1le t~e military were refusing to 
allo~ the bodies to be buned m accordance with Islamic 
practices. 
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In a statement on 18 December 1990, T APOL con-
demned the wave of killings in Aceh and called on gov-
ernments to exert pressure on the Suharto regime to halt the 
killings. 'Those responsible for the killings must be 
brought to justice. Since this cannot be done in Indonesia, 
an International Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity 
should be convened to investigate the abuses in Aceh and 
hold the Suharto regime responsible for its campaign of 
death and mass intimidation, ' the statement said. 
While the Foreign Office later told T APOL that it was 
'deeply concerned at the allegations of widespread 1killings 
and torture', it downplayed the words uttered by Pramono, 
taking comfort in reports that he had been reprimanded. It 
also complained that it was 'exceedingly difficult to obtain 
accurate information about events in Aceh'. [Minister of 
State the Earl of Caithness, in a letter to T APOL.] 
' 
Although TAPOL continued to publish detaile? reports 
of atrocities, mass killings and mass graves m Aceh 
throughout 1991 and 1992, and Asia Watch and Amnesty 
International both issued more reports estimating that thou-
sands of people had been killed, that is pretty much how 
matters have remained for the past eight years. 
When the UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, 
summary and arbitrary executions, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, 
sought permission in 1994 to visit East Timor in the after-
math of the Santa Cruz massacre, he also asked to go to 
Aceh. His visit to East Timor went ahead but permission to 
visit Aceh was refused and the international community 
chose to let the matter rest. 
Now, with Suharto removed from power and the people 
of Aceh gradually freeing themselves from the shackles of 
fear and intimidation, the truth about the regime's murder-
ous policy towards the people of Aceh is coming to light. 
I 
ACEH 
DOM status introduced 
In 1991, after almost two years of continuous military 
operations, far exceeding what was happening at the time 
either in East Timor or in West Papua, Aceh was declared 
a daerah operasi militer (DOM) or 'military operational 
region'. According to human rights !lCtivists and NGOs in 
Aceh, this was done at the behest of the governor of Aceh, 
Ibrahim Hasan, under whose rule the military reigned su-
preme. Hasan had been appointed governor to win the 
Acehnese over to the government party, GOLKAR, at a 
time when Aceh was still a stronghold of the Muslim party, 
the PPP. Until the 1987 election, Aceh was one of the few 
regions where GOLKAR had been unable to secure a ma-
jority. 
Many groups in Aceh are now calling for Hasan, a ci-
vilian, himself an Acehnese, to be called to account before 
a court of law for his role in placing Aceh in the grip of 
military terror. 
'Widows villages' 
Earlier this year, as Acehnese began to reveal the depth 
of their sufferings during the past decade, bereaved women 
were the ones to come forward, the wives of men who have 
disappeared over the past ten years. So widespread has the 
slaughter and disappearances of men been that there are 
villages in Aceh known' as 'widows' villages' . Many 
women also spoke of being raped, often in front of their 
husbands and children, or after their men-folk had been 
seized, leaving them more vulnerable in their homes. 
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Following a visit to Jakarta in June by two Acehnese 
widows who took their complaints to Parliament, one of 
the commissions decided to send a fact-finding mission to 
Aceh. During a tour through the province in July, their 
meetings were attended by hundreds of people eager to 
testify, even though the mission was headed by a retired 
officer and one of the members, Major-General Sedary-
anto, was until recently military commander of North Su-
matra. 
Jn Sigli, around one thousand people turned out to meet 
the mission, most of them widows and orphans. Space does 
not permit us to reproduce all the horrifying testimonies 
published in the press during the DPR mission's many en-
counters with victims. One woman said she had been raped 
by three men when she and her husband were arrested and 
taken to a security post. Three other women had been 
stripped naked, burnt, given electric shocks and one had 
ACEH 
BAND 
X BUKIT SENTA NG 
' 
then decapitated and his head taken back to his village 
where it was put on display. 
In many instances, the victims said that they or their 
loved ones had been taken to army posts known as Pos 
Saltis which stands for Satuan Tugas Strategis dan Taktis 
or 'Strategic and Tactical Taskfo~ce' . Almost i~variably 
the soldiers were identified as commg from the elite corps, 
KOPASSUS. One member of the mission, Dr Muchtar 
Azis; an MP from Aceh, said that all the data he had com-
piled pointed to KOP ASSUS officers as the .ab.users. On 
several occasions members of the DPR m1ss1on asked 
people how they 'knew their abusers were from the elite 
corps, only to be told: ' We know them all very well and 
can easily recognise them.' 
'Skulls Hill' and mass graves 
Aceh is also home to a place called Bukit Tengkorak, 
Skulls Hill, the origins of which go back to 1965 when 
victims of the slaughter of thousands of suspected commu-
nists and sympathisers by troops acting on the orders 
of Suharto, were disposed of there. 
JALAN MOBIL OIL X 
HEUEN KRUENG TJAMPLIE X 
X BUKIT TENGKORAK 
According to Abdurrahman Yacob, director of 
the Legal Aid Institute in Aceh, ten mass graves have 
been discovered in three sites; one is near the town 
of Pidie, 75 kms south-east of the capital Banda 
Aceh, and the other two in east and north Aceh. A 
Jakarta weekly, Ummat, reported that there were PTPV X 
X MASS GRAVES 
Some of the mass graves recently revealed to the public 
her hand smashed and is permanently disabled. 
Another woman who had been arrested in 1992 with 
her husband, M Yusuf, was raped in a cell next to his and 
thrown into the river the next day. She was later allowed 
home but never saw her husband again. Villagers from 
Desa Cibrek told her he had been publicly executed in their 
village. Ramlah from Simpapg Jurong, Geumpang, the 
woman whose hand had been smashed, told the mission 
that she had been taken to a security post (Pos Sattis) and 
held by soldiers who were looking for her husband and 
children. When they found them, she was freed but the rest 
of her family were killed and buried in a mass grave in 
Geumpang. [Serambi Indonesia, 29 July 1998] 
In the same issue, Serambi Indonesia reported that go-
ing from village to village, local NGOs had collected in-
formation about 1,679 cases, including rapes, torture and 
disappearances. In some places they had been told about 
scores, even hundreds of abuses. 
Several papers report the execution of two members of 
a local football team who were hanged from the goal-post 
and shot. The father of one of the men, forced to witness 
the execution, was later killed as well. One man was killed, 
between 1,000 and 1,420 bodies buried in these mass 
graves [Reuters, 6 August 1998], while the Jakarta 
daily, Suara Karya, quoted the parliamentary fact-
finding mission as saying they had seen ' thousands' 
of skeletons in mass graves. [Financial Times, I 
August 1998] The flood of Indonesian press reports 
about mass slaughter in Aceh prompted The Jakarta 
Post to publish an editorial on 6 August (two days 
before Wiranto's hasty visit to Aceh). The editorial, 
entitled 'The Aceh Killing Fields', quotes the Jakarta 
weekly, Gatra: 
'Teuku Ayah could hardly believe his eyes. His 
knees trembled when he saw hundreds of corpses 
piled up in a hole in front of him like dead rats. No 
sooner had he recovered his composure than an offi-
cer ordered him and his companions to bury the bodies 
and level the ground over the mass grave. Ayah's fear 
heightened when an officer tied another man to a tree and 
shot him dead. The body was simply left their to decom-
pose'. 
Such is the extent of the slaughter that went virtually 
unnoticed at the time, that new mass graves are being dis-
covered all the time. Maimul Fidar of the NGO Forum 
Aceh, announced that they had found many mass graves 
and had been able only roughly to assess the number of 
bodies in each. One at a cross-roads near Plantation V in 
Lhokseumawe, is thought to contain between 100 and 200 
bodies, while one at Skull Hill, Suerake, probably contains 
between 200 and 300 bodies. 
Plans by local NGOs to exhume the bodies could en-
counter difficulties because of the extreme sensitivity of 
such an operation, which would require the supervision of 
experienced forensic e~perts. In addition, investigations of 
the mass graves are bemg hampered by intimidation from 
unidentified groups. Local residents, who are the source of 
information regarding the whereabouts of mass graves 
have been visited by unknown men and warned not t~ 
speak to reporters or NGOs. [Reuters, 15 August 1998] 
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But as The Jakarta Post rightly points out in its editorial 
quoted above, the legacy of mass graves left by the mur-
derous Suharto regime is by no means confined to Aceh, 
recalling killings in East Timor and in Tanjung Priok in 
1984. (However, the paper fails to mention the even greater 
killing fields of 1965/1966, the legacy of the mass slaugh-
ter of hundreds of thousands of alleged communists.) 
The disappeared 
Estimates of the number of disappeared in Aceh vary 
from around 1,000, or 5,000, a figure used by the Aceh 
regional assembly [Waspada, 29 July 1998], to 39,000, the 
figure mentioned several times by 
Maimul Fidar of the NGO Forum 
Aceh, based on research undertaken 
by the Forum and a journalist from the 
Jakarta weekly, Gatra. 
ACEH 
electric wires were attached to her vagina and breasts and 
she was given shocks throughout the night. Her older sister 
and mother were tortured even more severely for fifteen 
days before the mother was transferred to Rancong while 
the sisters were allowed to go home. 
After hearing that KOPASSUS troops were to be with-
drawn, the sisters went in great distress to the local assem-
bly, pleading for help to find their mother. 'If those troops 
are withdrawn, where can we turn 'for help to find our 
mother?' they said. 
This figure was arrived at from 
spot-checks of the number ·of disap-
peared in the worst affected and the 
least affected villages in the three 
most militarised sub-districts, north 
and east Aceh, and Pidie. They cross-
checked their findings by looking at 
official statistics of the size of the 
TERiMA KASiH 
I DOM. DiHAPUS 
TApi ... 
SUAMi SAYA ... ? 
population of Aceh and the number of 
widows and reached a figure of 
30,000 people unaccounted for ac-
cording to the first method and 39,000 
according to the second. These inves-
tigations were undertaken well before 
the fall of Suharto and the activists are 
now busily collecting individual tes-
,l(ll((((lf 
Thanks for abolishing D<!,M, b~t: .. what about my husband? Merdeka, 11.08.98 
timonies to back up their findings, which would have been 
impossible formerly. 
The worst period by far was during 1990 and 1991 but 
the abuses have continued up to the present day. 
On 13 August 1998, a group of NGOs in Aceh made 
public a list of thirty-four men who disappeared from their 
homes from January until May this year. The list includes 
the names of the victims, their age, place of residence, the 
pas sattis to which they were taken and the names of their 
wives. 
The announcement by General Wiranto on 8 August 
that all combat (that is to say, KOPASSUS) troops would 
be withdrawn from the region within a month has con-
fronted the NGOs and the relatives of victims with a di-
lemma as this will mean removing abductors who should 
be identified, taken into custody and forced to reveal the 
whereabouts of people who have recently disappeared. 
Serambi Indonesia [ 11 August 1998] highlighted the 
plight of two sisters, Rosmiati and Rasyidah, whose 
mother, Nyak Maneh, disappeared after troops took her to 
the notorious torture centre, Rancong in Lhokseumawe. 
The husband of one of the sisters had returned home earlier 
this year, ill and with a severe limp, after having been 
thrown down a ravine with two other men. Fortunately, his 
fall was broken by a tree but the other two were killed and 
it was left to him to inform their wives. Since returning 
home, he has left again in fear of his life, apparently after 
being spotted by an army spy. 
In March this year, two of the daughters and their 
mother were taken from their home by elite corps soldiers 
and tortured. Rasy, aged 21, who had already previously 
been raped, was stripped naked, her hands and feet tied; 
Nyak Maneh Abdullah, 35, a widow from Rinti Village, 
Mutiara, Pidie has testified that she was taken into custody 
by the military as a hostage for her husband. She wa5 
struck so hard on the head with a truncheon that her hear-
ing has been seriously impaired. Under extreme pressure, 
she told her tormentors where her husband was. But in 
May this year, she was seized again and taken into custody, 
with her two-year old son. In front of this child, she was 
raped and her breasts and vagina were given electric 
shocks to try and force her to reveal the whereabouts of her 
husband. Nyak Maneh said she knows the identity of the 
rapist and is eager to expose him to the authorities. [From 
an article in Republika, 9 August entitled: The Horror of 
Skulls Hill which also elaborates on the discovery of many 
mass graves.] 
But Nyak Maneh's troubles were by no means over. As 
preparations were being made for troops to be withdrawn, 
a KOPASSUS officer visited her at home and asked her, in 
threatening language, who had told her to report her expe-
riences to the local assembly. 'I did it myself. Many people 
in the village are reporting. I'm not afraid anymore,' she 
told him. [Serambi Indonesia, 19 August] 
4 unidentified men dumped by army 
The mysterious appearance of four men in two villages 
in north Aceh on 12 August has caused great consternation. 
The men were seen on the back of a security truck shortly 
before they were pushed off on the road from Medan to 
Banda Aceh. Wearing only their underpants, they were in 
dreadful physical shape, with wounds suggesting that they 
had been tortured. When villagers tried to succour them 
with food, the men screamed hysterically, 'Stop electro-
cuting me, stop hitting me on the head. It's painful,' and 
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held their hands up as if trying to shield their heads from 
blows 
The men were in such a stressful state that they ran off. 
As they ran, a truck drove past, hitting one of the men and 
killing him. The other three disappeared. The dead man has 
a number of recent wounds and several of his front teeth 
are missing from an apparent blow to the face. Local peo-
ple think that they are four of the 34 men listed as having 
disappeared this year and believe the security forces have 
abandoned them before troops are withdrawn later this 
month. [Serambi Indonesia, 16 August] 
NGOs demand accountability from ABRI 
NGOs in Aceh have undertaken the daunting task of 
documenting atrocities from a severely traumatised popu-
lation. While devoting their energies to this extremely 
stressful work, they insist that the most recent disappear-
ances can be resolved quickly because the events are so 
fresh in people's minds. The whereabouts of these men 
should be investigated and the identity of their abductors 
revealed before the combat troops are withdrawn as an 
nounced by Wiranto on 8 August. 
In a joint statement on 13 August, fi.fteen !ocal and na-
tional NGOs responded to General Wiranto s announce-
ment by asserting that his apology was far from ade9~a~e. 
'The armed forces,' they said, 'must take full respons1b1hty 
under the law for all the many abuses perpetrated against 
the people of Aceh and identify those persons directly re-
sponsible'. They contemptuously dismissed the General's 
decision to replace the GPK stigma with GPL, saying that 
Acehnese would again be stigmatised by circles intent on 
using such a label for personal gain. They also said that the 
families of the disappeared must be given financial sup-
port. 
Aceh, for so long isolated and neglected at home and 
abroad, is now in the forefront of exposing the indescrib-
able atrocities of the Suharto regime. All the credit for this 
must go to the local NGOs and the people of Aceh for their 
courageous determination to document their experiences, 
however painful this is. Acehnese civil society in post-
Suharto Indonesia is now piecing together the horrors 
through which people lived while state terror reigned su-
preme in their region. We owe it to them to press for action 
from the international community. * 
Calls for independence reverberate in West Papua 
Since the downfall of Suharto, the political atmosphere in West Papua has shifted dramatically in 
favour of independence for the territory. Flag-raising ceremonies in a number of cities in July, to 
mark the 27'h anniversary of the proclamation of West Papuan independence, were brutally crushed 
by the armed forces with several deaths, scores wounded and scores more arrested. The armed forces 
commander said such activities will be treated as 'acts of rebellion'. 
On 1 July this year, the West Papuan flag, the 'Morning 
Star', was unfurled in several places in West Papua and in 
other places, huge demonstrations took place demanding 
that the West Papuan people have a say in the future of 
their country. )~y openly confronting the authorities, peo-
ple were taking great risks, challenging Indonesia's an-
nexation of the territory and its incorporation as a province 
called Irian Jaya. Unfurling the West Papuan flag has oc-
curred on many occasions over the past three decades. As a 
very public and demonstrative act, it has always invited a 
harsh response from the forces of occupation and scores of 
West Papuan men and women have served long prison 
sentences for this. 
West Papua was handed over to Indonesia by the Dutch 
under a UN-endorsed plan in 1963 brokered by a US dip-
lomat. A so-called 'act of free choice' in 1969 was held 
while the country was in the grip of repression; a council of 
1,026 hand-picked tribal leaders, virtually at gunpoint, de-
cided unanimously to remain a part of Indonesia. Although 
a UN monitor cast doubt in his report on the legitimacy of 
the act, the UN General Assembly 'took note of the out-
come and from then on, regarded the dispute as having 
been solved. 
Since then, no member state of the UN has raised the 
issue of West Papua's status. However, in June this year, 
some members of the US Congress wrote to President 
Habibie, raising serious questions about the human rights 
situation in West Papua and touching also on the status of 
the territory. This letter was translated into Indonesian and 
circulated widely _in the country, raising hopes among West 
Papuans of renewed interest from the international com-
munity in their fate. 
We-st Papuan flag I q 61 
But the July campaign in favour of independence was 
pr~mpted first and foremost by pent-up anger at more than 
thirty years of heav)'.-handed suppression of protests about 
n.umerous human rights abuses, disregard for the land 
nght.s of the people t~ make way for transmigration and 
loggmg, and the unbridled exploitation of West Papua's 
mineral r~sources~ bringing a severely damaged environ-
ment and impoverishment to the rightful land-owners. 
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Jayapura and Sorong: two shot dead 
The most striking demonstrations took place in the 
capital, Jayapura, in Sorong in the west of the country, at 
the Cendrawasih University on the outskirts of Jayapura 
and in Biak city on the island of Biak. 
In Jayapura on 1 and 2 July, hundreds of people gath-
ered at the regional legislative assembly to express dissatis-
faction over the treatment of the people of West Papua for 
more than thirty years. They denounced the 'act of free 
choice' and called for a proper referendum. They staged a 
sit-in overnight with local residents providing food. On the 
second day, the crowd grew to more than a thousand. 
When they refused to disperse on the orders of the army, 
there were clashes, with troops ·wielding truncheons and 
rifle-butts. Many people were injured and there were a 
number of arrests. 
The demonstration in Sorong involved thousands of 
people, many of whom had travelled in from neighbouring 
villages. They gathered at the district assembly building 
and called on the Indonesian President to give West Papua 
its independence immediately. They supported the 1 July 
1971 proclamation of West Papuan independence by the 
OPM - the Free Papua Mqvement - which has been waging 
armed struggle since 1965. They also called for the imme-
diate withdrawal of the Indonesian armed forces and the 
release of all West Papuan political prisoners. 
When their efforts to present these demands were re-
buffed, some people in the crowd started attacking cars and 
shops, in response to which the troops opened fire . Two 
people, one a pregnant woman, were killed. 
Student fatally wounded 
On 2 July, 2,000 students attended a free-speech forum 
on the Cendrawasih Univer~ty campus at which the status 
of the territory was discussed. Earlier, Cendrawasih stu-
dents had held a number of protests about human rights 
violations in the Central Highlands, around the villages of 
Bela and Alama, where eleven people were shot dead by 
troops and 126 people died from hunger or disease after 
being driven from their gardens. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 
147, July 1998.] · 
While the free-speech forum was underway, some stu-
dents became suspicious of a man whom they recognised 
as an army intelligence agent. When they started attacking 
him, troops standing watch outside the campus entered the 
premises and opened fire. Two people were hit and· rushed 
to hospital. A high-school pupil was hit in the knee and a 
22-year old law student named Steven Suripatti was 
gravely wounded in the head. After more than two weeks 
in intensive care, Steven died on 27 July; he never regained . 
consciousness. The officer who had been attacked was in-
jured and, according to the army, died later in hospital. 
Biak: Flag-raisers gunned down 
On 2 July, the Kejora (Morning Star) flag was unfurled 
on a water-tower in Biak harbour. The Papuans were ba-
. ton-charged the next day and in the ensuing fracas, two 
soldiers were reportedly killed, according to eye witnesses, 
though the army has never admitted this. The flag-raisers 
held their ground and kept the flag aloft. The flag became 
the centre of attention and stirred great enthusiasm among 
the people in the town. On 4 July, the local military com-
manded warned of dire consequences if the flag was not 
taken down by the next day. The warning was ignored. 
WEST PAPUA 
Early on 6 July, the people sleeping under the flag-pole 
were woken by gunfire. They were surrounded by heavily-
armed troops coming from land and sea. The shooting 
continued as people fled in all directions. Many were shot 
in the legs but some were hit in the chest, head or stomach . 
Eye witnesses later spoke of a great deal of blood and 
claim to have seen a number of dead bodies. Scores of 
people were wounded. Dozens were arrested and held in 
police cells, including people with gunshot wounds which 
were not properly treated. 
Demonstration of Papuans in Jakarta. The posters say: Whether 
we eat or not, we want independence, We, Papuan people want 
freedom, We need the Freedom. 
Many of the wounded were taken to Biak general hos-
pital and the navy base hospital, both of which were placed 
under heavy guard with no one being allowed in for days 
to check the whereabouts of missing relatives or visit the 
wounded. According to eye witnesses, many wounded 
people left town to return home rather than go to a hospital 
for treatment. 
Biak casualties 
An investigation by the National Human Rights Com-
mission appears only to have scraped the surface. It found 
evidence from hospital records that one person, Ruben Or-
boi, had died of his wounds in hospital but his body was 
removed in an ambulance belonging to one of the armed 
forces and not returned to the family. Twenty-three others 
sustained gunshot wounds. 
According to local human rights groups, nine people 
were still missing at the end of July . Among them was a 
62-year old man who left home shortly after the shooting to 
look for his son who had been involved in the flag-raising. 
The son later returned home safe and sound. Munir, the 
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director of KONTRAS, the Commission for Missing Per-
sons and Victims of Violence, which has set up a branch in 
Jayapura, said later that the number had fallen to five, 
though the names he published included some persons not 
on the earlier list of nine. He accused the military of re-
sponsibility for the disappearances. The five are a male 
nurse, a taxi driver, a student and two white collar workers, 
one of whom is a woman. [AFP, 17 August 1998] 
Three weeks after the bloody attack, twenty people 
were still in police custody, apparently awaiting trial. They 
are likely to be charged for rebellion, under Article 106 of 
the Criminal Code and face a penalty of life imprisonment 
or 20 years. They include a high-ranking government em-
ployee named Philip Karma who is regarded by the 
authorities as the ring-leader. He is known to have been 
badly wounded in both legs but was not taken to hospital 
for treatment. 
Since the incident, Biak has been stricken with fear and 
anxiety from lack of information about the many wounded 
and missing. Days after the attack, local fishermen reported 
seeing corpses floating near the coast, some with gunshot 
wounds. Some of the bodies were hastily buried by the 
local military authorities without allowing autopsies to take 
place. 
A local fisherman said he had seen six bodies on two 
separate days soon after the shooting and believes they 
bore bullet wounds. According to The Guardian corre-
spondent in Indonesia, altogether fifteen bodies were 
washed ashore, one of which was identified as someone 
who went missing on 6 July. The military authorities 
claimed that the bodies were victims of the tidal waves 
which hit the north coast of Papua New Guinea on 17 July 
even though some came ashore before then. More bodies 
were washed ashore after the tidal waves but they would 
have had to float 600 kilometres to reach Biak. The Bishop 
of Jayapura, Leo Laba Ladjar, rejected the idea as un-
founded while John Rumbiak of the Human Rights Advo-
cacy Team for Irian Jaya insisted that autopsies should 
have been conducted identification and to determine the 
cause of deatn. ,[Jakarta Post and The Guardian, 30 July 98] 
New Forum wants status reviewed 
In a striking break with the past, the three Christian 
churches in West Papua, along with traditional and com-
munity leaders, have decided to raise the fundamental issue 
of the status of Irian Jaya. Until the fall of Suharto, they 
had chosen to function strictly within the Republic of In-
donesia in their attempts to seek redress for the massive 
violations under his dictatorial regime. In fact, there were 
repeated delays in making public the report of abuses in the 
Central Highlands which was finalised late last year be-
cause the church leaders in Jayapura were reluctant to face 
a major confrontation with the military. As a result, the 
report was finally made public on 25 May this year by the 
local church leaders in Timika. 
The Bishop of JayapGra and the heads of the two Prot-
estant churches, the GKII and the GKI, were signatories of 
a statement issued by the newly-formed Forum for the 
Reconciliation of lrian Jaya Society (FORERI) on 24 July 
which lambasted developments in the territory since 1965, 
complaining that the 'centralised system of government 
(had) led to many deaths and the destruction of property ... 
·to shooting, torture, intimidation, even murder of people in 
Irian Jaya ... while members of the army had been given 
medals (for) their achievements in murdering their compa-
triots'. It added: 'Could it be that the Indonesian govern-
ment is drawn to Irian Jaya not by its people but by its 
natural resources?' 
The church leaders who gave their imprimatur to this 
important initiative are the Rev. Herman Saud, c~air of the 
GKI Synode in Irian Jaya, the Rev. Dr Benny G1ay on be-
half of the GKII, and Dr Leo Laba Ladjar OFM, the 
Bishop of Jayapura. 
Making their assessment of conditions in the wake of 
events surrounding I July this year, FORERI said: 'What 
. people in Irian Jaya want in essence is the opportunity to 
handle their own affairs, in other words, FREEDOM.' 
They came close to calling openly for a referendum, 
saying: 'It is absolutely essential that there should be a test 
of the opinion of the people regarding the status of the ter-
ritory of Irian Jaya.' 
Its other demands were for the armed forces to exercise 
restraint and avoid the use of force, an end to the terri-
tory's status as a 'military operational region', the release 
of all those held following the events of 1 - 6 July, and the 
investigation and prosecution of those responsible for a 
series of grave human rights abuses since 1977. 
The other signatories were three student leaders, Gerson 
Abrauw, Maria Korano and Marthinus Werimon, two 
women leaders, Selviana Sanggenafa, and two traditional 
leaders, Tom Beanal and Theys Eluay. 
!ff . 
- / .r. 
West Popuon human r-i3hts? 
Call it West Papua! 
Other groups representing West Papuans living or 
studying in Java have come out onto the streets of the 
capital, condemning the use of the name Irian Jaya and 
demanding that its proper name, West Papua, be restored. 
Their demands echo the demands put forward in Sorong 
and elsewhere in West Papua. 
The changing mood is also reflected in the Indonesian 
press,. s?me of which. have carri.e~ articles by West Papu-
ans g1vmg an analysis of cond1t1ons in the territory that 
would never have seen the light of day under Suharto. * 
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Stubborn Orde Baru remnants 
The Habibie government has been in office now for more than three months, enough time to judge 
whether it truly reflects a break with the Suharto era. How genuine is the commitment of the 
Habibie government to genuine reform? 
Many activists are disappointed with the pace of 
democratisation. Several crucial issues remain un-
touched while some burning issues have gone forward 
at a snail's pace. 
Most scenarios of the Suharto overthrow envisaged 
the aging dictator being held responsible for his 32-
year bloody, despotic rule. Impeachment would follow, 
after which he would be forced to account before a 
court of law for his many crimes against humanity. The 
reality was different. Suharto was forced to step down 
by mass demonstrations but the handover was more in 
the nature of a 'palace revolution', with the two main 
players, Habibie and General Wiranto, securing crucial 
levers on power. 
Power consolidation 
These two have a complex relationship with each 
other. In many ways they are rivals while at the same 
time they rely heavily on each other. Habibie emerged 
as the successor because this was the most convenient 
option for Wiranto and the bulk of ABRI, the armed 
forces. Habibie's mass base was very limited and much 
ea_sier to control than people like Amien Rais or Megawati 
wh~ enjoy mass support. 
While Habibie is not in a position to take decisions 
about the ABRI leadership, he has helped to enhance the 
position of Wiranto, who is concurrently ABRI commander 
and defence minister, on several occasions in the last few 
months. In his first days as president and concurrently 
ABRI supreme commander (Panglima Tertinggi, Pangti), 
Habibie signed documents sacking several important gen-
erals like Lt-General Prabowo and Major-General Muchdi. 
Having a civilian as supreme commander is a new ex-
perience for Indonesia. The ex-dictator, a five-star general, 
not only used this position to promote, reshuffle and de-
mote officers but also to initiate military operations. 
Habibie's role as Pangti is bound to be different, given 
that the relationship between the president and ABRI will 
be quite complex, sometimes depending on each other, 
sometimes competing and possibly ending up in conflict 
with each other. 
The President v. ABRI 
Suharto effectively grabbed power in October 1965 but 
it took almost two years before he was officially sworn in 
as president. This hiatus was used by ABRI to smash and 
paralyse civilian political life. In August 1966, the military 
held a crucial seminar that laid the political foundations of 
the Orde Baru. Some analysts correctly argue that by 1967 
ABRI was the only organised political force in the country 
while Suharto, the most senior officer, held all the positions 
of power: as president, as ABRI commander-in-chief, as 
minister of defence and as commander of Kopkamtib, the 
notorious security agency. 
Several years earlier, General Nasution had designed a 
military doctrine called Dwifungsi or ' dual-function ', to 
justify the army's role in civilian affairs. This was at a time 
when the army's role in politics was relatively obscure. 
Political affairs were firmly in the hands of civilians and 
the military were basically confined to barracks. 
In 1967 with Suharto as president, everything changed 
and Dwifungsi emerged as the only dominant political 
doctrine in Indonesia. Military presence in the administra-
tion was not only overwhelming in numbers but ABRI in 
effect became the only political force in the country. Su-
harto stood at the apex of the junta and very soon started to 
depoliticise ABRI as well. No one knew better than he how 
potentially dangerous ABRI was for his own position. Sev-
eral contenders for power were swept aside and relegated 
to obscurity. The Suharto dictatorship emerged and the 
Orde Baru regime became increasingly synonymous with 
the Suharto regime. 
By the mid eighties, ABRI had been reorganised and 
politically domesticated. Suharto was the boss and the 
ABRI top merely functioned as a security body to serve the 
political needs of Suharto. It can be argued that ABRI lost 
its political independence, functioned like a German sheep 
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dog to protect the political and economic interests of the 
Suharto family and cronies. Top generals were hand-picked 
bv Suharto and consisted mostly of former adjutants or 
p~esidential guards. including General Wiranto. 
Negotiating a new relationship 
General Wiranto played a key role in deciding who 
would replace Suharto. On 21 May, when Sµharto an-
nounced his resignation, General Wiranto announced that 
ABRI backed the constitutional promotion of Habibie as 
president. In 1965 ABRI functioned both as king and king-
maker; in 1998, it was reduced to being just the king-
maker. 
hands of Suharto to maintain his power. In the last t_en 
years Suharto sai? that ABRI should act ~n ac~or?~nce with 
the Javanese saymg, tut wuri handayam, or gwdmg from 
behind', as king-maker rather than king. 
Wiranto's speech of 17 July reflects this change while 
openly demanded a share in power, a pro-active form of tut 
wuri handayani. ABRI's third man in command, Lt. Ge~­
eral Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is regarded as the ~am 
ideologue of ABRI. As chief of staff for social and poht1cal 
affairs he is responsible for redefining the Dwifungsi. Ac-
cording to the 17 July speech, it has been streamlined to 
four points: 'ABRI need not necessarily always be in 
front', 'ABRI will change from dominating things to ex-
erting an influence', 'ABRI will seek to influence things 
indirectly rather than directly', and 'ABRI will agree to 
share responsibility in political affairs with its non-military 
partners'. 
ABRI' s distrust of civilian politicians is 
almost as old as the Indonesian Republic. 
Historians and ABRI watchers know that the 
struggle for independence proceeded along 
two different Jines: a political struggle through 
diplomacy and a military struggle through 
guerrilla warfare. The military always insists 
that it was their struggle that ultimately won 
Indonesia its independence, a view that is 
contested by most Indonesianists. To this day, 
ABRI leaders hold religiously to this 'sacred 
truth' as part of their ideological baggage, 
even though most were still babes in arms at 
the time. 
Sharing power 
Evening Herald, 22-05-1998 
The post-Suharto period is now three 
months old and power is being shared by Su-
harto's two golden boys. Earlier this year it 
would have been unthinkable for Suharto to 
be constitutionally toppled by two trusted loy-
There are many explanations as to why ABRI did not 
grab power on 21 May. The economic meltdown is clearly 
part of the answer. The ABRI top realised that if they ran 
the country, jt would complicate matters. The international 
community would not accept a military regime while ABRI 
itself lacked the expertise to run the economy. Globally, 
military regimes are now a rarity which top officers, many 
trained in the US and the UK, know only too well. 
Others argue correctly that ABRI have lost their politi-
cal skills. Political emasculation turned them into little 
more than glorified firemen, whose job it was to preserve 
law and order. On the morning of 21 May Habibie was 
catapulted to power and Wiranto became the architect of 
the constitutional coup - the ultimate king-maker [see also 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 147, July 1998]. A fortnight later an 
ABRI delegation visited the new president to confirm their 
support. 
On 17 July, General Wiranto delivered a key speech to 
ABRI senior officers reformulating the social-political 
functions (another terniinology for Dwifungsi) of ABRI. 
Obviously some kind of deal with the Habibie group bad 
been struck. 
Reformulating the Dwifungsi 
Despite the fact that Dwifungsi remained the dominant 
political doctrine in the Suharto era, ABRI's political .influ-
ence was drastically eroded. ABRI became a tool m the 
alists. Some people still seem to think that Suharto is tut 
wuri handayani, or guiding from behind, or as Suharto de-
scribed it more recently, lengser keprabon, which means 
that when the king retires, he stays in the background act-
ing as the wise elder statesman. 
However, nothing could be further from the truth. Indo-
nesia has definitely entered the post-Suharto era, and there 
are no grounds for thinking that Suharto or his kin will be 
able to make a come back. 
For ABRI a new era has emerged, not unlike 1965. The 
ABRI leaders have become active political players and/or 
power brokers. The main difference is that now, they have 
to share power with civilians headed by Habibie. After · 
having had their economic and political wings clipped by 
Suharto, they now want to make a comeback in both sec-
tors. ABRI' s political base is still firmly rooted in the re-
gions where many provincial governors, district chiefs and 
sub-district chiefs are military. Together with the ABRI 
territorial structure that reaches down to village level, they 
have a stranglehold on political and economic affairs. Peo-
ple in the region will need to wage a resolute struggle to 
drive back the military back to the barracks. 
When he took over, Habibie's power base was rela-
tively small. Although he became head of ICMI the Asso-
ciation of Muslim Intellectuals, in 1990, he nev~r played a 
key political role. In any case, ICMI has never had a mass 
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ABRI has never been so unpopular. 
Today, Habibie is backed by large sections of ICMI and 
some ICMI stalwarts now hold key positions in the cabinet 
and the bureaucracy. There have already been tensions 
between the Habibie clique and ABRI. Power struggles 
have broken out over top positions. The battle over the 
Golkar leadership was particularly significant. 
The Golkar leadership battle 
The leadership battle in Golkar was first and foremost a 
test as to whether Orde Baru forces could make a come-
back. It would show whether Habibie could benefit politi-
cally and whether ABRI would at last get off the back of 
the party. 
For weeks Cendana (Suharto's private residence) had 
been making move to regain control of Golkar. Retired 
General Edi Sudradjat was their candidate for the chair 
against Habibie's candidate, Akbar Tandjung, his new 
minister/secretary of state. 
Golkar is not easy to define. Set up by the military in 
the 1960s to fight the growing influence of the Communist 
Party, it later became Suharto's political vehicle. Some 
analysts described it as the ruling party but increasingly it 
became the party of the ruler. Suharto was head of the Ad-
visory Board, a position comparabie to the general secre-
tary of the politbureaus of communist parties in the former 
Soviet bloc. High-ranking officials were automatically 
high-ranking members of Golkar. 
Golkar consisted of three components, the ABRI com-
ponent reflecting the military influence, the bureaucracy 
component reflecting Golkar as an extension of the bu-
reaucracy and the third component consisting of political 
big shots who held the top echelon positions. 
POLITICS 
Lacking a substantial power base of his own, Habibie 
opted to tum Golkar into his poiitical vehicle. Using the 
practices so fine-tuned by Suharto, bribes paid in brand-
new bank-notes flowed to the delegates to support the new 
president's candidate who defeated Edi Sudradjat, a former 
armed forces commander and then defence minister, de-
spite the fact that many branches were led by local ABRI 
bigwigs. A statement by General Wiranto that ABRI would 
not interfere in the party's affairs clinched Habibie's vic-
tory. 
Wiranto's decision to disentangle the armed forces from 
Golkar could shake the party to its foundations. For more 
than 25 years, its leadership consisted predominantly of 
high-ranking officers. It remains to be seen whether ABRI 
will indeed withdraw. Although Wiranto wants to control 
political events more directly through ABRI headquarters 
in Cilangkap, many retired officers are still entrenched in 
Golkar structures. ABRI's share in the Habibie cabinet is 
still quite sizeable. No fewer than five key positions are 
held by the armed forces, the minister-coordinator for po-
litical and security affairs, the defence, interior and infor-
mation portfolios and the attorney-general. 
Another shift that could profoundly affect Golkar's 
chances in the coming elections is that government em-
ployees are no longer required to be members of Golkar's 
civil service union, Korpri, and are free to vote for parties 
of their choice. 
Orde Baru remnants and reformasi 
While Suharto's Orde Baru has entered history, most of 
its structures and personnel are still in place and are being 
used by both Habibie and Wiranto. Pro-democracy groups 
have started using the term Suhartoism to refer to the stub-
born structures that stand in the way of reformasi. 
Both Habibie and Wiranto have repeatedly procjaimed 
their commitment to reformasi. but as always with people 
in power, they shy away from supporting drastic changes. 
Both are working hard to consolidate and increase their 
own power bases. In Habibie's case, he is moving in two 
directions, joining civil society in driving back the political 
influence of ABRI while trying to build a coalition with 
sections of ABRI. Habibie may well. seek accommodation 
with retired ABRI officers who enjoyed high office· in the 
closing days of the Suharto period. 
Wiranto has already defined the general thrust of his 
strategy by reformulating the Dwifungsi. At the same time 
he is busy trying to repair the tarnished image of ABRI. 
The battle between ABRI and the pro-reformasi movement 
will be crucial for the future of democracy in Indonesia. • 
continuation from page 16 
A first in Esperanto 
The publication by the Portuguese Esperanto Society 
consists of a speech entitled, 'Timor, The Hell Just Next 
Door' in Esperanto, which was delivered at the s2nd 
World Esperanto Congress in Adelaide in 1997. The 
speech is also published here in Portuguese and English, 
along with very useful graphics, maps and figures. The 
value of this book, slender as it is, is that it takes the issue 
of East Timor to what must be a largely new audience. • 
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Who gave the orders to Prabowo ? 
The case of .the disappeared activists has been front-page news for weeks and pressure from the 
public has forced ABRI to set up a DKP (Officers Honour Council) for purposes of damage limita-
tion. The pressure group KONTRAS, set up to take on the cases of missing persons, is daily attack-
ing ABRI generals, while activists like Pius Lustrilanang who re-emerged after being abducted, in-
sists that the entire ABRI leadership, including ex-President Suharto, are involved. 
This is not the first time that 
ABRI has been forced to set up a 
special council to investigate high-
ranking officers. International 
pressure following the Santa Cruz 
massacre in 1991 compelled ABRI 
to set up a council to remove a few 
officers. This time, several senior 
Kopassus officers, including Lt. 
General Prabowo, will be heard by 
the DKP, the Officer's Honour 
Council. 
ABRl's image has never been 
as bad as it is today. No one 
doubts that the armed forces were 
involved in the May looting and 
raping. ABRI's military operations 
in Aceh and West Papua [see sepa-
rate articles] are now being 
brought to light by civil society in 
both regions and the ABRl leader-
ship has admitted that responsibil-
Pius arriving back home, next to him a poster about Prabowo. 
ity for the disappearances rests with Kopassus, the notori-
ous red-beret crack troops. 
Demolishin~ the evidence 
In the meantime, many disappearances are still unre-
solved. High profile cases like the student leader Andi 
Arief who ' was kidnapped on 28 March have been well 
p\iblicised . In this case, the victim has been outspoken 
about what ihappened to him [see also TAPOL Bulletin 
No.147, July 1998]. Andi Ariefis convinced thatKopassus 
was not the only unit to have taken part in his kidnapping; 
others were involved, including territorial units and the 
police. His conclusion is that kidnapping is standard proce-
dure in the armed forces. Top ABRI generals have been 
trying to insist that the wrong-doings were simply the re-
sult of officers wrongly interpreting or excessively carrying 
out orders. 
Infof" . , .ion about how and where the kidnapped were 
held is 11°.:iw being publish€d the press. Piecing together the 
evidence and descriptions given by 'reappeared' activists 
like Desmond Mahesa, Andi Arief, Waluyo Djati and Pius 
Lustrilanang, it is clear that their 'prison' was situated in 
Cijantung, the headquarters of Kopassus but the complex 
has recently been bulldozed and a small garden with flower 
beds has appeared in its place. 
State violence 
Ever since the first victim re-emerged and gave testi-
mony, a great ?eal of evidence has come to light. It became 
clear that sections of ABRI were doing the dirty work for 
S~harto's vi?lent. politics. Prabowo himself has already 
h~nted that his umt, Kopassus, was involved in the kidnap-
pmgs. He told the tabloid Adil: "The operations conducted 
by my men were based on the assumption that there were 
people who were a threat to the safety of the nation. There 
were people who were making bombs and planning to 
brin~ down the government. What I and my men did was in 
the interests of the nation and for the safety of the people. J 
and my people are dedicated to the state ". 
Kopassus has always been an elite unit moulded in the 
tradition of the US green-berets and the British SAS. A 
Kopassus soldier not only excels in combat skills but is 
als~ . equippe.d wit~ training in counter-insurgency. Interro-
gat1?n techmques mcluding torture are part of the training. 
As 1s known many Kopassus officers have obtained train-
ing in the US and UK. 
In 1996 when he was commander of Kopassus 
PrabO\':'o decid~d ~o set.up a new unit called Group Four t~ 
deal with special mtelhgence tasks which, as it turns out 
included kidnapping activists. ' 
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son-in-law Prabowo could have received his 
orders directly from Suharto, bypassing ABRI 
headquarters. 
Suharto and Petrus 
Two adversaries Prabowo and Wiranto 
In the early eighties over a period of sev-
eral months hundreds of corpses were found 
in many cities, often left lying in the streets. In 
some cases, their bodies bore bullet wounds 
or were badly mutilated. It became known as 
the Petrus affair from pembunuhan misterius, 
for mysterious killings. All fingers pointed 
towards ABRI commander-in-chief General 
Benny Murdani who was conducting a so-
called clean-sweep against crime. Only very 
few human rights lawyers had the courage to 
protest against the random killings. Nobody 
was ever punished for this wave of senseless 
killing. A decade later Suharto casually ad-
mitted in his autobiography that he had given 
At least 14 still missing 
According to Kontras, the organisation that deals with 
disappearances and victims of violence, at least 14 persons 
are still missing. They include pro-democracy activists: 
Suyat (23 yrs), Herman Hendrawan (28) and Petrus 
Bimo Anugrah (25); people who were involved in the 
Mega-Bintang campaign: Dedy Hamdun (44), Noval 
Alkatiri (31) and Ismail (30); . PDI-Megawati activists: 
Yanni Afri (Rian, 27) and Sonny (28) and people who 
disappeared during the May 1998 riots: Yudin Muhidin 
(22), Hendra Hambalie (19), Ucok Munandar Siahaan 
(21) and Triyono (23). There are another two cases but 
the relatives are unwilling to allow the names to be made 
public. There are others who have disappeared, but some 
may have gone underground because they thought they 
were being hunted by the military. 
The role of Suharto and Feisal Tanjung 
Kontras co-ordinator Munir has emerged as one of the 
most the vocal critics of ABRI. He rejects the DKP proce-
dure because this it only deals with the ethical question 
whether an officer has violated procedures. It has become 
more than obvious that some high-placed military should 
be put on trial. Statements made by commander-in-chief 
Wiranto and the main suspect Lt.General Prabowo make it 
clear that someone higher in rank gave the order. There are 
very few higher-ranking officers above the three-star Gen-
eral Prabowo. 
Political weeklies are suggesting that either former 
ABRI commander-in-chief, four.;.star General Feisal Tan-
jung or ex dictator, five-star General Suharto gave the 
command to abduct the activists. Fe"isal Tanjung now holds 
a senior cabinet post as co-ordinating minister for politics 
and security affairs. He is regarded as a colourless figure, 
whose only attribute was loyalty to Suharto. It is hardly 
likely that he would have launched the operation without 
consulting Suharto. 
It is much more likely that Suharto was the one who 
gave the orders. The Suharto family all live together in the 
same complex and their homes are interconnected. The 
place is known as Cendana, the name of the street where 
Suharto's private residence is located. It is suggested that 
the order for the streets to be cleaned of criminals as a form 
of 'shock therapy' . 
The disappearances are clearly political cases. The peo-
ple who were abducted were clearly threats to Suharto's 
rule. As early as 1995 it became clear that Suharto was 
determined to safeguard his seventh term for 1998. It 
meant that anybody seen as hindrance had to be removed. 
Victims of abduction like Pius Lustrilanang are convinced 
that Suharto himself gave the orders. 
How far will ABRI go? 
It remains to be seeri how far ABRI will go in 'clearing 
out' their own stable. The ABRI leadership are evidently 
willing to sacrifice top Kopassus officers, including Colo-
nel Chairawan, Major General Muchdi and Lt. General 
Prabowo. But the DKP Honour Council is only about 
military ethics; it is not a court of law. Public outrage in 
Indonesia has reached a point where people are demanding 
that the perpetrators must be put on trial. 
A recent trial about the killing of four students at Tri-
sakti University resulted in minimal sentences for two po-
lice officers charged with 'misinterpreting orders'. This 
trial which was clearly nothing more-than a damage limita-
tion exercise, scape-goating a few members of ABRl, has 
aroused public anger. 
The reputation of the armed forces is at stake and civil 
society want things to go much further than a few mean-
ingless trials. What is needed is structural change in ABRI. 
The police force must be separated from ABRI and placed 
under civilian control, a demand that is already widely 
supported, even by President Habibie. In the new political 
laws now being drafted, ABRI are likely to lose some at 
least of their seats in parliament. 
Most critically, the various military intelligence units : 
Bakin, BIA, Kopassus and the 'intel' units attached to the 
territorial commands must be disbanded. These are the 
gangs who organised the kidnappings, the rioting and the 
many killings and atrocities that have plagued the people of 
Indonesia for the past 32 years. 
Above all, civil society now demands that ABRI must 
return to barracks, ending the nightmare of militarisation in 
Indonesia. * 
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TAPOL activist stopped from entering .Indonesia 
For many years, the New Order regime kept a blacklist of people who are prevented from en.tering_ or 
leaving Indonesia. When the list was first compiled is anyone's guess. When TAP_O~ ~o-ed1~or Liem 
Soei Liong tried to enter Indonesia in July this year, he discovered.that ~e was still d1cekal on the 
instructions of General Wiranto, Minister of Defence/Commander-1n-Ch1ef). 
The word 'cekal' is a typical New Order creation. It is a 
combination of cegah meaning 'to prevent' and tangkal 
meaning 'to shield from' . Whatever its origins, the word 
has now developed a life of its own. 
Don't imagine that you can seek information about 
whether you are on the list; things have not changed in the 
Habibie era. No one is allowed to know why he/she was 
listed or whether the name has been scrapped. Lack of 
transparency is part of the game, creating uncertainty a~d 
fear, a characteristic of the Orde Baru. Many Indonesia 
scholars, academics, activists and journalists have been on 
the blacklist at one time or another but some are known to 
have been removed. 
Lack of transparency 
Four agencies, the Finance Ministry, the Justice Minis-
try; the Defence Ministry and the Attorney General's of-
fice, are entitled to put 'undesirables' on the cekal-list, 
including Indonesian passport holders who are prevented 
from leaving the country and foreigners who are prevented 
from entering. Any of the four agencies can put a name on 
the list but it ·needs the agreement of all four for it to be 
removed. 
Any sovereign country, democratic or totalitarian, has a 
blacklist to prevent drugs dealers, embezzlers or alleged 
terrorists from leaving· or entering the country but keeping 
people out for political reasons is a rarity these days. 
In the Suharto era, no one questioned the fact that 
somebody was blacklisted as complaints were ignored 
anyway and no explanations were forthcoming. Blacklisted 
people had two options, to give up visiting Indonesia or try 
to enter through smaller entry-points. Indonesian activists 
needing to travel abroad took the same precaution. 
The main-frame computer at Cengkareng airport, Ja-
karta is connected to the computers at Medan and Den 
Pasar airports. Smaller entry points also have computers 
but immigration officials often don't bother to look. Some 
small harbours have no computer and rely on computer 
print-outs which are often out-of-date or too cumbersome 
to read. 
Political blacklisting 
The Immigration Department has never revealed the 
number of people blacklisted for political reasons nor what 
the criteria are The way cases are handled leaves much to 
chance. Some people are stopped, then let in while others 
are refused and immediately deported. 
Since the late seventies, East Timar seems to be the 
main reason for · blacklisting. Attending an international 
East Timor conference or being critical of the invasion is 
more than enough. Embassy officials seem to be the 
watchdogs, reporting to one ·of the intelligence agencies, 
Bakin or BIA. Usually this is someone i9 the political sec-
tion or the military attache. This would explain the lack of 
consistency as some embassies are more alert than others, 
and a changeover in staff can also make a difference. One 
embassy fanatic may put a whole group of people on the 
list while in other countries, they are not bothered. 
Political blacklisting is primarily the responsibility of 
BIA, the intelligence body under the ABRI commander-in-
chief who is concurrently the minister of defence. 
The case of Liem Soei Liong 
When Liem arrived at Jakarta airport on 19 July, an 
immigration official spotted his name on the cekal-list and 
took him to the immigration office. He had arrived with 
Pius Lustrilanang, the activist who was kidnapped by the 
military and held for two months. Hundreds of activists 
were at the airport to meet them, several of whom were 
already inside the immigration section. 
Liem, who carries a Dutch passport, discovered that he 
was blacklisted according to document SKEP/634/X/1997 
of 16 October 1997 signed by General Wiranto. The immi-
gration officials told him a cekal order is valid for one year 
and can be automatically extended indefinitely. 
Soon, the place was buzzing. Pius and the demonstra-
tors outside refused to leave unless Liem was allowed in 
and they started arguing with immigration. Then Bambang 
W. Suharto, a member of Komnas Ham, the National 
Commission of Human Rights, appeared. Despite all the 
pressure, immigration wouldn't budge unless they got the 
green light from their superiors. 
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At one point, the immigration office was full of people, 
Hendardi, Ratna Sarumpaet, Jopie Lasut, Yenni Damay-
anti, Agus Lennon, Desmond Mahesa, Paskah lrianto, 
Trimedya Panjaitan, Mindo Rajagukguk, Maria Pakpahan 
and many more. 
It was left to Bambang Suharto talk to the authorities. 
Being Sunday, senior officials were contacted at home or 
elsewhere. An immigration official phoned Justice Minister 
Muladi who was on his way to Jakarta. He told Bambang 
Suharto he had no objections but it was Wiranto who had 
blacklisted Liem. 
Bambang eventually got through to General Wiranto 
who said there were 'security problems'; he mentioned a 
talk Liem gave in 1994 in Bandung and alleged that Liem 
was indikasi, in other words a communist suspect. He said 
that Liem should make an application to enter Indonesia, 
which would have to come from abroad and would be dis-
cussed at an ABRI staff meeting. 
So Liem was forced to get on the next plane for Singa-
pore where he made a hand-written application to General 
Wiranto. No reply has yet been received. 
Kidnapped by BIA in 1994 
Liem had previously managed to enter Indonesia le-
gally several times through smaller entry-points. In June 
1994 he spent a month in Indonesia but towards the 'end of 
his visit, BIA discovered that he was in the country. They 
monitored a meeting in Bandung where he gave a talk to a 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
crowd of local activists. Two days later he was kidnapped 
by seven BIA agents and taken to the BIA office in Pasar 
Minggu. One of the BIA directors, Brig. General Slamet 
Singgih was responsible for the operation. After persistent 
interrogation, he was taken to the Jakarta Police HQ and 
interrogated until deep in the night. Lastly he was taken to 
immigration head office and from here he was deported. A 
three day nightmare. 
His blacklisting goes back to 1981, cekal number F4-
IL.0103-565 dated 31 August 1981. A few months earlier, 
he had spoken out at an international conference on East 
against the Indonesian invasion. By that time he was al-
ready a holder of a Dutch passport. 
Orde Baru and Orde Reformasi 
Several things have changed in the post-Suharto era but 
some things have remained the same. 
Some leading Indonesian activists whose passports had 
been confiscated, went to their nearest Indonesian embassy 
immediately after Suharto's downfall and received new 
passports. They include Yenni Damayanti, Reza Muhar-
ram, Pipiet Rochyat and George Aditjondro. Their 'crimes' 
were seen as misdeeds against Suharto, who is no longer in 
power. People like Liem have committed similar 'crimes' 
but for him nothing has changed. 
There needs to be a campaign to put an end to political 
blacklisting. • 
Prisoner releases: A slow business 
On 17 August, the government announced the release of a further 28 political prisoners, bringing 
the total freed since Habibie took power to around one hundred. For the first time, three of the 1965 
prisoners were included. The government itself admits that they have only released half of the pris-
oners. For reasons best known to themselves, the government has chosen to handle the releases in 
piecemeal fashion. 
As the East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana 
Gusmao, who is serving a 20-year sentence, said: 'If this 
government really wants to call itself a regime of reform, 
then Mr Habibie has to release all political prisoners with-
out conditions.' The only conceivable explanation for han-
dling the releases piecemeal is, as Budiman Sudjatmiko, 
chair of the PRO, the People's Democracy Party, has said, 
that 'the prisoners are being used as a bargaining tool with 
the international community'. [The Guardian, 18 August] 
Three elderly, ailing men allowed home 
The three released prisoners who had been arrested and 
tried for their alleged involvement in the 1965 events that 
triggered Suharto's seizure of power are: 
Alexander Warouw, 81, who was freed from a prison 
in Balikpapan. Warouw was serving a life sentence and 
had been in prison since October 1965. He is known to be 
a diabetic and suffering from associated ailments. 
Pudjo Prasetyo, 70, arrested in November 1997, who 
was serving a life sentence and was held in Kedung Pane 
Prison, Semarang. He is suffering from Parkinson's disease 
and has for years been in such poor physical shape that he 
requires assistance for all his daily needs. In 1997, TA-
POL was able to make contact with him and published an 
interview. Even after his ordeal of thirty years in prison, he 
could still speak optimistically about the positive prospects 
for democratisation Indonesia and liberation for East 
Timor. The photo we published, taken in 1995, shows him 
to be extremely frail. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 139, Feb-
ruary 1997] 
Manan Effendi Tjokrohardjo, 78, arrested in October 
1965, who according to our latest information, was being 
held in Kalisosok Prison, Surabaya. He was serving a life 
sentence. He is known to have had a stroke and is now 
paralysed. 
To defend himself against any hint of leniency towards 
communism which he alleges is still 'traumatic' for the 
Indonesian people, Justice Minister Muladi said that the 
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grounds for their release were strictly humanitarian. This is 
why, he said, only three have been released so far. They 
were not granted amnesties but were given presidential 
clemency. [Suara Pembaruan, 16 August] 
This leaves ten 1965 prisoners still in prison. Four are 
under sentence of death, of whom three, Asep Suryaman, 
(73), Bungkus (71) and Nataneal Marsudi, (71) are in 
Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, while the fourth, Isnanto, (74) is 
in Tanjung Gusta Prison, Medan. The other six are all 
serving life sentences excepting Buyung Ketek, (59) re-
Photo from Cipinang prison. Centre, Xanana Gusmao (bearded), 
on his right Wilson, recently released. 
garding whom very little is known except that he was tried 
in August 1986 and sentenced to fifteen years; he is now in 
Padang Prison, West Sumatra. 
Acehnese, Papuans, Timorese released ... 
The bulk of. the political prisoners released in the latest 
wave were East Timorese, West Papuans and Acehnese. 
The six Acehnese released included one woman, Nur-
hayati Hasani who was serving a six-year sentence. Three 
of the other five who we have been able to identify from 
Amnesty lists are serving 4-year sentences or less. If Am-
nesty International's list of 55 prisoners [see Indonesia and 
East Timor, Prisoner List, 4 June 1998, issued by Amnesty 
Indonesia together with Human Rights Watch] is complete, 
this still leaves 49 Acehnese prisoners in prison. 
The three West Papuan prisoners are each serving very 
harsh sentences of seven years. Harsh as they may be, 
these are the lightest of all the sentences being served by 
West Papuans on the Amnesty list. All the West Papuan 
and Acehenese prisoners had been tried for subversion. 
Ten East Timorese were also named in the release de-
cree. However, four were not in fact in gaol but had 
charges against them removed. 
. . . but no more PRD releases 
Following a decision by the State Administration Court 
in August to lift the ban on the PRD, it was widely ex-
pected that all the remaining PRD prisoners would be re-
leased, including the chair, Budiman Sudjatmiko. Since 
they had been convicted and given harsh sentenc~s for se~­
ting up an illegal party which has now been legalised, their 
releases should have been automatic. However, that was 
not to be. 
In the third wave which took place on 24 July, four 
PRD prisoners were released. They were Wilson bin N?r-
tiyas and Ken Budha Kusumandaru who were servmg 
five years and four years respectively, and Coen Pontoh 
and Mohamad Sholeh who were serving three years and 
six months and four years respectively. 
On that occasion, fifty prisoners were released of whom 
thirty-six were involved in a movement known as 'Divisi 
X' who had allegedly been holding unlawful military exer-
cises. Three were women who in charge of preparing food 
for the group: The group also included several members of 
the army who had deserted. The 36 declared that they 
would refuse to leave prison because their leader was not 
induded. No. names are available. 
When the releases were announced, sixteen prisoners in 
Cipinang Prison, Jakarta including Xanana Gusmao and 
Budiman Sudjatmiko, strongly denounced the discrimina-
tory nature of the releases and demanded that all political 
prisoners be released without discrimination and uncondi-
tionally. They also said they would refuse to leave prison, 
should they be scheduled for release, until these demands 
had been met. 
When the prison authorities in Cipinang Prison went to 
collect Wilson and Ken Budha from their cells, they found 
the doors bolted and chained, with both men refusing to 
leave. Saws had to be used to cut open the cell doors, after 
which the men were forcibly removed from the prison. 
PRD lawsuit against Suharto and others 
Following the unbanning of the PRD which the gov-
ernment decided not to contest, the party leadership an-
nounced that they were filing a lawsuit against three top 
government officials for banning the party which had re-
sulted in their activists serving long prison sentences. The 
lawsuit will also cover the abduction of three PRD activists 
who are still missing. The officials named in the lawsuit 
are: the former president, Suharto, General Feisal Tanjung 
(now Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Af-
fairs) who was armed forces commander at the time of the 
campaign of vilification of the PRD, and General Syarwan 
Hamid, now Interior Minister, who was social and political 
affairs chief of staff of the armed forces at the time. 
The lawsuit accuses the three of making groundless al-
legations against their party such as that they were com-
munists and part of the outlawed PKI. * 
continuation from back page 
'home-coming'. This -is a model of solidarity which will 
come as an inspiration to other groups around the world. 
George Aditjondro, an Indonesian scholar now teaching 
in Australia, who has chapters iri both books, writes here 
about the sufferings of the women of East Timor, written 
for presentation to the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women. His chapter in the IWGIA is a reprint of 
his well-known article on the environmental damage in-
flicted during the Indonesian occupation . 
The collection also includes the speech by Justice Mar-
cus Einfield opening the exhibition on Genocide in East 
Timor and the Holocaust which was taken on tour to sev-
eral countries by Jim Aubrey. continued on page 11 
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International outcry against ga~g-rapes 
Members of the Team of Volunteers for Humanity which so meticulously documented the rapes of 
Chinese women during the May riots in Jakarta visited Washington, Geneva and Amsterdam to help 
increase international awareness. They were accompanied by victims whose testimonies moved their 
audiences to tears. Many demonstrations have taken place outside Indonesian embassies, most of 
which were organised by federations of overseas Chinese. 
The Jesuit priest Romo Sandyawan 
who heads the Team, testified before 
the Human Rights Caucus in Washing-
ton, describing the large-scale raping, 
looting and other barbaric acts as state 
violence. The systematic and organised 
way in which the violence was perpe-
trated followed the pattern of earlier 
riots in Surabaya, Solo, Palembang and 
elsewhere. The term state violence is 
indeed appropriate for the structural 
terror of the Or de Baru. 
The Tim Relawan untuk Ke-
manusiaan (Team of Volunteers for 
Humanity) were the first to reveal the 
characteristics of the perpetrators who 
instigated the May riots, muscular men 
with crew-cuts and often with tattoos, 
whipping up anti-Chinese sentiments 
and rushing from shopping malls to 
housing projects. They doused shops 
and houses with gasoline, setting off 
devastating fires. While this was going 
on, at least 168 women were raped and 
sexually molested by similar types. 
Action in Jakarta. The posters say:' Stop State Violence against 
women', 'Systematic raping, find the instigators!' 
Tim Relawan has drawn up a detailed report which was 
completed last month and which proved beyond doubt that 
the organised gang-rapes in May were part of a plot to in-
stigate riots in Jakarta and other parts of the country. The 
stories in the report are hair-raising and have stirred deep 
emotions all over the world. 
Karlina Leksono, an astronomer, who is a member of 
the Team, stressed the importance of international solidar-
ity and described the difficulties faced back home. She her-
self and others have frequently receive death threats by 
phone while rape victims have been intimidated with gro-
tesque photos of women being sexually molested. 
Tim Relawan also said that the . May rapes were not an 
isolated event. Women in Aceh, West Papua and East 
Timor have also been victims [see article on Aceh] of 
gang-raping. In East Timor, rape has been an established 
part of the brutal terrorisation of the people since the Indo-
nesian invasion in December 1975 
According to Tim Relawan the only way to prevent 
structural violence from happening is to strengthen civil 
society by organising people in their neighbourhoods and 
creating networks of neighbourhoods. 
The brief visit abroad helped create deeper understand-
ing around the world. about the nature of organised terror 
that still exists in Indonesia. 
Embassies flooded by protests 
The· gang-raping of mostly Sino-Indonesian women in 
May has now become a major issue around the world and 
protests have occurred across Asia, Europe, Australia and 
the American continent. 
Web sites have greatly helped circulate information. 
Press clippings, detailed reports, video reports and photo 
material have circulated widely and action committees 
have been set up in a number of countries 
In Australia public meetings were held in the major 
cities attended by large crowd.s. The Australian govern-
ment wrote to Habibie urging him not to let the situation 
deteriorate any further and to end discrimination against 
the ethnic-Chinese. 
In the US, there were many demonstrations and public 
meetings in the main cities. In San Francisco a protest took 
place in front of the Indonesian consulate and a teach-in, 
attended by more than 1,200 people, was held. The teach-
in was organised by ICANET (Indonesian Chinese Ameri-
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can Network). The Indonesian community in the San Fran-
cisco Bay area consists of more than 13,000 people, most 
of them Sino-Indonesians. The meeting was addressed by 
Willie Brown, mayor of San Francisco. 
A large protest took place in Boston on 7 August when 
1,000 demonstrators marched from Chinatown to the 
Holocaust Memorial. The rally was organised by the over-
seas Chinese community and attended by the local chapters 
of NAACP and the National Organisation for Women. 
Huge demonstration at the Indonesian consulate in San Francisco 
Smaller protests took place in Los Angeles, New York City 
and Washington. 
In Europe several protest meetings were held, particu-
larly in Germany and Holland. Several local action groups 
have been set up in Germany, while in Holland a new or-
ganisation AKUI (Humanitarian Action for Indonesia) was 
established; it hosted the Tim Relawan visit and organised 
a public meeting that was attended by more than 300 peo-
ple. In Londot;) ,severaJ Chinese organisations held a protest 
in front of the Indonesian embassy. 
Asian protests 
There were a number of protests in ASEAN capitals. In 
Kuala Lumpur more than 70 organisations sent representa-
tives to the Indonesian embassy. A similar protest took 
place in Singapore where women's organisations expressed 
their anger about the May events. 
In Manila 300 people protested outside the ASEAN 
foreign ministers meeting, holding aloft placards saying: 
Indonesia, where are your Human Rights? and No to Anti-
Chinese Racism. In the statement, a comparison was made 
with anti-Jewish pogroms by the Nazis. Another demon-
stration of over one thousand people, organised by the 
Philippine-Chinese Association, went to the Indonesian 
embassy. 
On 17 August, Indonesia' s Independence day, demon-
strations took place in several capitals, including Manila 
and for the first time also in Bangkok. 
In Hong Kong three demonstrations took place within a 
week, demanding swift and thorough investigations and the 
prosecution of the perpetrators. Angry crowds threw rotten 
eggs at the Indonesian consulate-general. A demonstration 
in early August attracted more than I 0,000 people. . 
Anger in Taiwan was very deep, with MPs and pu~hc 
figures joining the demonstrators. Press and TV reportmg 
was extensive. A delegation of Taiwanese NGOs flew to 
Jakarta to express their anger. The Taipei government 
twice sent protests to the Habibie government. On 3 
August hundreds of demonstrators hurled eggs at t~e Indo-
nesian representative office, calling on the Indonesia~ ~ov­
ernment to punish the rapists and compensate the v1ct1ms. 
An altar was set up and incense sticks were burned to 
mourn the killings in May. The pro-
test was organised by the New Party 
and the Association of Returned 
Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. 
Protest from Beijing 
Quite unexpectedly, there were 
also strong words from Beijing. On 3 
August the Chinese government 
called on the Jakarta government to 
punish rioters who brutalised the eth-
nic Chinese minority during the dis-
turbances. The People 's Daily, the 
Communist Party daily, carried a 
front-page article demanding just 
treatment and protection for ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia. Several dem-
onstrations took place at the Indone-
sian embassy in Beijing, with the 
tacit agreement of the Chinese gov-
ernment, organised by students and 
women's organisations together with 
organisations of overseas Chinese. 
Two Chinese newspapers had published photo essays 
on the violence, prompting public outrage against Jakarta 
but also against the Chinese government for failing to react 
sooner and more forcibly. At a meeting in a Beijing hotel 
decorated with feminist slogans and pictures of the victims, 
prominent women, many dressed in black and with yellow 
ribbons condemned the rapes. There were emotional re-
sponses to a speech by an ethnic Chinese woman from In-
donesia who told the audience: 'Young women don't dare 
to go out because nowhere is safe.' [International Herald 
Tribune, 18 August] 0 
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CGI aid not the answer 
International donors pledged $7.9 billion in aid to Indonesia at the annual Consultative Group on 
Indonesia (CG/) meeting at the end of July, fifty per cent more than last year. But the package will 
not provide long-term relief to the stricken economy unless the World Bank/IMF relinquish their 
control over economic policy and President Habibie fulfils his commitment to political and 
institutional reforms. 
This year's CGI was dominated by the economic crisis 
and its social effects, described by the W.orld Bank as the 
most dramatic reversal in fortune of any country in recent 
history. · 
The donors' top priority - to cover the 1998/99 budget 
deficit, estimated at 8.5 per cent. of gross domestic product 
- was met by a $7.9 billion package of quick-disbursing 
loans and a similar short-term fund of $6 billion agreed by 
the IMF in mid-July. Britain's contribution to the CGI 
commitment increased to $46 million from the 1997 figure 
of$16 million. 
During the 1990s, the CGI, chaired by the World Bank, 
bankrolled the Suharto regime to the tune of more than $5 
billion in financial assistance each year. Massive loans 
were granted with total disregard for the regime's contempt 
for democracy and human rights and its lack of 
transparency and accountability. 
This year's 49 per cent. increase from the 1997 figure 
of $5.3 billion signifies the determination of the West to 
maintain its malign influence over economic policy without 
confronting the issue of political reform. The decision to 
provide a further bail-out to the Habibie regime is flawed 
both economically and politically. 
Economic recovery still remote 
The markets were unimpressed by the CGI package as 
the rupiah and local stock prices lost ground following the 
announcement of the new deal. In the past week, the 
rupiah has stabilised at a slightly higher rate. There is still 
no sign of a significant improvement in the economy. 
In the past, the CGI's aid commitments were largely 
concerned with project aid, but this year's total consists 
almost entirely of programme aid to help balance the state 
budget. Most of the funding is, therefore, short term and 
will not create a significant incre_ase in desperately-needed 
income-generating capacity. 
The Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) had 
already expressed concern at the unprecedented amount of 
foreign aid financing, which accounted for 43 per cent. of 
the state budget approved by the House on 23 July. The 
United Development Party (PPP) warned that developing 
the country with huge foreign aid financing was perilous, 
especially if it was implemented amid rampant corruption, 
and that debt servicing would impact on welfare provision 
and the quality of public services. 
The neo-liberal economic recovery programme for 
Indonesia devised by the IMF and the World Bank, based 
on the deregulation of capital flows, simply duplicates the 
volatile conditions which contributed to the original 
economic collapse. The long-term cutbacks in public 
spending will have a devastating impact on those hardest 
hit by the crisis. The right of the World Bank/IMF to lead 
the rescue attempts must now be vigorously challenged. 
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Indonesia's sovereign indebtedness will be increased 
substantially by the CGI package and the earlier: IMF bail 
outs. It is already one of the world's most heavily indebted 
countries. In March 1998, public sector debt amounted to 
$65.6 billion. A significant proportion of the aid being 
disbursed this year is simply being used to service loans 
from earlier years (total repayments due in 1998 were 
estimated at $6.4 billion). Debt servicing will be an 
increasing problem in future years and will impact 
primarily on the poor, especially when subsidies on basic 
commodities are eventually withdrawn according to 
IMF/World Bank dictates. 
If theCGI donors had been concerned with the plight of 
ordinary Indonesians as much as their own economic 
agendas, they would have included an element of debt 
forgiveness in their package. Funds saved on debt servicing 
could then have been used to improve the social safety-net. 
A limited agreement on debt re-scheduling was reached but 
that is not enough. 
The CGI should also have pressed the Indonesian 
government on its apparent reluctance to pursue the wealth 
of the Suharto family, which could have covered the 
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budget deficit several times over. Some estimates have put 
it as high as $40 billion - just short of the original IMF bail-
out of $43 billion. 
Political reform stalled 
The fundamental reason for the continuing economic 
crisis is the failure of the Habibie government to implement 
the political reforms it promised. Progress has been made, 
but some measures have been tokenistic and many people 
remain deeply suspicious of Habibie ' s intentions and his 
ability to fully implement the necessary changes. 
On the eve of the CGI, Habibie made announcements 
on the release of political prisoners and the withdrawal of 
troops from East Timor in an attempt to persuade the 
international donors to back him. Significantly, he 
succeeded in bringing the Dutch back on board. In 1992, 
Suharto rejected further aid from the Dutch because of their 
criticism of Indonesia's human rights record. The Dutch 
stated that they are now satisfied Indonesia is changing and 
moving towards democratisation and better human rights. 
It is questionable whether their faith is justified since 
there has been a lack of progress on a number of issues, 
notably: the release of political prisoners; the withdrawal of 
troops from East Timor; the pursuit of the Suharto wealth 
and the overhaul of the corrupt system of governance; the 
lifting of restrictions on the right to free expression, the 
right to freedom of association and the right to organise; 
the pursuit of those responsible for abductions, killings, 
disappearances, torture and violence against women under 
Suharto; the reform of the military; the creation of an 
independent judiciary; and the repeal of repressive 
legislation aimed at government opponents. 
After the CGI package was announced, the 
International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development 
(INFID), a coalition of over I 00 national and international 
NGOs, denounced the $7.9 billion worth of pledges as an 
attempt by donor nations ' to revive government credibility 
in the eyes of the international community without taking 
into account the reality of the situation in Indonesia'. ' ... a 
loan of this magnitude will in no way help Indonesia to 
resolve this crisis, since the public continues to express 
considerable doubt to the legitimacy of the Habibie 
government, due to its incapability in implementing 
transparent and good government,' it added. 
It is clear that the economy will not recover until far-
reaching reforms of Indonesia's constitution, laws and 
policies are implemented with the object of establishing a 
political economy based on democracy, human rights and 
the right of everyone to share in the fruits of development. 
The role of the World Bank 
Political reform in the sense just described is not a 
concern of the World Bank and its fellow donors, whose 
primary goal is to foster conditions favourable to Western 
business interests. This explains the Bank's refusal to 
become involved in the political issues of democracy and 
human rights. It is not, as it claims, an apolitical 
institution, but its political agenda is very different from 
that of the majority of people in the developing countries it 
is supposed to be assisting. 
This also explains why the World Bank has shown no 
remorse for helping to keep Suharto in power for so long 
and for ignoring the corrupt foundations on which 
economic growth was built. In its annual report for the 
CGI, Indonesia in Crisis: A Macroeconomic Update, it 
states, without apology, that: 'Long-standing defects in 
governance, earlier camouflaged by rapid growth, have 
European Parliament resolution on Indonesia and East Timor 
In the wak(! . of the downfall of Suharto in May, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in 
June, sponsored by almost all the political groupings, on the situation in East Timor and Indonesia. 
The European Parliament has been calling/or years for permission to visit East Timor. The demand 
is again reiterated towards the Habibie government. 
The resolution expressed regret that moves towards 
greater political openness in Indonesia had been limited so 
far and regretted above all the failure to release the major-
ity of political prisoners. It called for the immediate and 
unconditional release of Xanana Gusmao, the East 
Timorese resistance leader, and all political prisoners, East 
Timorese as well as Indonesian, stressing that under no 
circumstances should they be treated as criminal. 
The new Indonesian government, it said, should pursue 
reforms in the direction of democracy as rapidly as possi-
ble, and to set a date as ,c-quickly as possible for free and 
democratic elections while taking action to improve peo-
ple's living standards and fighting corruption. 
The Indonesian government should also conduct full 
investigations into all cases of human rights abuses under 
the previous regime and take judicial action against their 
perpetrators. 
On East Timor, the European Parliament said that, in 
the. context of the changes underway in Indonesia, firm 
action should be taken to ensure self-determination for the 
people of East Timor, on the basis of respect for interna-
tional law and UN resolutions. 
It also reiterated the position expressed in its resolution 
of 21 November 1991 in the wake of the Santa Cruz mas-
sacre, calling for a delegation to visit the territory and said 
that 'the Indonesian government must, once and for all, 
take steps to enable this delegation's visit to take place'. * 
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now been exposed as fatal flaws.' The Bank's own role in 
covering up those flaws has long been apparent. 
For some time, analysts have criticised the Bank's 
poverty figures and its tolerance of corruption in its own 
projects, but a devastating critique of World Bank policies 
in the Wall Street Journal on 14 July suggested that there 
was a deliberate cover-up of Indonesia's plight. Annual 
reports on Indonesia 'highlighted its achievements but 
danced a semantic jig around such problems as nepotism 
and collusion,' said the article . 
Former consultants to the Bank accused it of sanitising 
reports to remove critical references to the government or 
its officials. The soft approach was demanded by 
government officials, who under World Bank practice got 
to alter reports before publication so that conditions seemed 
' feasible for donor countries to lend', said former finance 
minister, Frank Seda. This led to public and private capital 
flooding into the country, a maj"or contributing factor to the 
economic collapse in 1997. 
Seda pointed out: 'Until October 1997, when the crisis 
was under way, the World Bank was telling the world the 
ECON OM 
fundamentals were sound '. Even now, the World Bank ' s 
Country Brief on Indonesia, updated in June 1998, 
stubbornly proclaims Indonesia' s ' remarkable economic 
development success over the past decade ' and repeats the 
controversial mantra about a decline in poverty from 60 per 
cent. to 11 per cent. - about 28 million people - between 
1970 and 1996. 
Although the Bank acknowledges that poverty may now 
double to affect around 50 million people , Indonesia ' s 
Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that 95.8 mil lion 
people, about 48 per cent. of the population, will be living 
below the poverty line by the end of the year. This 
represents a regression to the poverty levels of 1976. 
In a frank admission of the World Bank ' s failings and 
the seriousness of Indonesia's current plight, Dennis de 
Tray, the Bank's Country Director for Indonesia, said: 'I 
will admit to have a very strong sense of not understanding 
fully .. . why things are so bad.' Such an admission of 
failure should mean the end, once and for all , of the World 
Bank's supervision of the Indonesian economy. * 
East Timor: Gestures are not enough 
There has been growing clamour for the release of resistance leader Xanana Gusmao to enable him 
to take part in negotiations to resolve the question of East Timor. But Jakarta, eager to show the 
world that it is more flexible following Suharto's downfall, has proposed autonomy for East Timor 
and announced the withdrawal of several hundred troops. However, it _remains inflexible on inte-
gration. 
The fate of East Timor is inextricably bound up with 
the current political and economic crisis in Indonesia. The 
downfall of Suharto paved the way for a new initiative 
from his successor. President Habibie, to distance himself 
from the previous regime. But he also needed to make 
gestures that would win plaudits from the West at a time of 
grave economic crisis. 
In a meeting with Bishop Belo in June, Habibie made 
an offer of special status for East Timor and a promise to 
withdraw some troops from East Timor. The 'special 
status' idea was further elaborated by Foreign Minister Ali 
Alatas as an offer of 'wide-ranging' autonomy which 
would only exclude control over foreign affairs, defence 
and financial matters. Several years ago, the governor of 
East Timor, Abilio Soares made a similar proposal, only to 
be firmly rebuffed by Suharto. 
The Alatas offer is coupled with the insistence that 
Portugal and ti)e international community accept the inte-
gration of the territory as part of Indonesia and a promise 
that the release of Xanana Gusmao would be part of the 
deal. 
UN talks 
The autonomy proposal was the centrepiece at the talks 
between the Indonesian and Po11uguese foreign ministers 
held under UN auspices on 5 and 6 August The UN com-
munique said that the ministers 'had agreed to hold in-
depth discussions on Indonesia's proposals for a special 
status, based on wide-ranging autonomy for East Timor 
without prejudice to their basic positions of principle.· In 
other words Portugal still sticks by its demand for self-
determination but is willing to consider the autonomy op-
tion, presumably as an interim measure. The ministers also 
agreed that the East Timorese would be more closely in-
volved in the search for a solution. The response from Jose 
Ramos-Horta, deputy president of the resistance council. 
the CNRT, was to say that he was no longer willing to rep-
resent Xanana Gusmao in talks because the leader himself 
should be directly involved and his release was essential 
for further progress . 
The two countries also agreed 'to establish interest sec-
tions in friendly embassies in each other's capitals and to 
relax their visa policies towards each other ' s nationals'. 
Previously. Portugal had insisted that interest sections 
could not go ahead until resistance leader Xanana Gusmao 
was released, but the way was cleared when Xanana said 
from his prison cell in Jakarta that it should go ahead re-
gardless of whether he was released or not. 
Xanana on the difficulties ahead 
l n an assessment of the present state of the talks. Xanam1 
Gusmao warned _ thaj tllt! negotiation process wi 11 be di ffi-
cult. giveil :Jakarta insistence on maintainin!!. its ille!!.al an-
nexation of East Timor. In a message issued~ on the ~occa-
occasion of the 25th anniversary of the founding of 
T APOL Bulletin No. 148. September 1998 21 
EASTTIMOR 
sion of the 25th anniversary of the founding of FALINTIL, 
the armed wing of the resistance on 21 August, Xanana 
was scathing about the Indonesian proposal for autonomy 
and accused East Timorese who 'passionately ' defend it 
of wanting 'to save themselves and ... save what they now 
own at the cost of our people' s sufferings. They also feel 
that, by supporting autonomy, they will be protected by the 
murderous Indonesian troops currently occupying East 
Timor. ' 
He also accused the supporters of autonomy of con-
ti nuing to advocate Indonesian arguments without realising 
that the process of political reforms in Indonesia had ren-
dered the arguments used by the Suharto regime invalid. 
He urged these people to reflect on the economic crisis in 
Indonesia and try to understand ' the complex process of 
reforms and the yearnings of Indonesian society'. Hence, 
East Timor's strategy must take full advantage of the de-
mocratisation process now underway in Indonesia. 
The murdered Orlando da Costa killed by the special forces. This 
atrocity occurred during the EU Troika visit to East Timor in June. 
In Dili, five political parties issued a joint statement on 
11 August totafly rejecting the proposal for autonomy 
whatever the form as this would legitimise integration. 
They called for the release of Xanana Gusmao to partici-
pate in the dialogue on East Timor's future 'as an essential 
condition to finding a solution to the question of East 
Timar. ' The five parties were Fretilin, the UDT, Apodeti, 
Kota (monarchist party) and Trabalhista (Jabour party). [In 
November 1975, members of the latter four parties signed 
the 'Balibo Declaration' asking Indonesia to take East 
Timor over. The authenticity of this Declaration has since 
been discredited and several signatories have said they 
signed under duress.] 
Autonomy in the Indonesian context 
By offering ' wide-ranging autonomy' to East Timor, 
the Habibie government is in danger of unleashing a flood 
of demands from many parts of the country. Since the 
abandonment of the 1950 United States of Indonesia con-
stitution, Indonesia has been a heavily centralised state, all 
the more so during the 32 years of Suharto's rule. As The 
Jakarta Post wrote in an editorial on East Timor [8 
August]: ' What about the country's other (sic) 26 prov-
inces. Are they not entitled to enjoy a greater degree of 
autonomy . . . and retain a greater part of their wealth for 
the development of their own provinces?' 
In Aceh, often referred to as the model for special 
status, the heavy hand of military occupation is now com-
ing to light (see separate item), and in West Papua the call 
for autonomy or independence is growing by the day. 
During the days leading up to. Suharto' s downfall , many 
regions were awash with calls for autonomy, even inde-
pendence, from Jakarta. 
The Indonesian Constitution makes no provision for re-
gional autonomy but among Indonesian democrats, calls 
for a federal state are growing. The Catholic social activist 
and philosopher, Y.B . Mangunwijaya, regards this as cru-
cial to prevent Indonesia from disintegrating like Yugosla-
via, and has called for the creation of a United States of 
Indonesia. [The Jakarta Post, 4 August] 
However, this is not the way forward for East Timar 
whose right to self-determination is enshrined in many UN 
resolutions and in the history of its violent and unlawful 
invasion and annexation. 
Western responses 
The question of East Timor is constantly being com-
mented on in the world's media and many western gov-
ernments have publicly called for Xanana's release. UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has now added his voice, as 
has the Australian government, whose ambassador in Ja-
karta recently visited Xanana in prison. 
A Troika ambassadorial mission to East Timor in late 
June, led by the British ambassador, called for Xanana's 
release and spoke of the need for direct contact between 
the Indonesian government and the resistance leader, who 
they visited in prison. It stressed the need for a ' firm com-
mitment to some form of direct consultation of the will of 
the people there on the issue of independence or on the 
basis of a negotiated settlement'. 
However, there appear to be pressures in the interna-
:ional com~unity .for 'stri~e~t emigre groups ' to go easy 
m Indonesia at a time of cns1s. This message comes across 
.;trongly in an article by Georgetown professor of Asian 
studies, James Clad entitled: 'For East Timor's Sake, Don't 
Push Jakarta Too Hard' . [International Herald Tribune, 21 
August] He quoted Alatas as claiming that Australia, Japan 
and the US 'all accept the sincerity of Mr Habibie's 
(autonomyt-a.ffer' . H~ also alleged that Portugal's EU part-
ners w_e~e. fed up ~1th Portuguese posturing', adding that 
after v1s1tm~ East Tm~~r, the Et? am?assadors wrote a pri-
vate report sharply cnt1cal of Lisbon s recent diplomacy'. 
Such views reinforce Xanana's warnings about the dif-
ficulties which lie ahead. 
Token withdrawal of troops 
Another gesture from Jakarta was the army's an-
nounc~ment that 1,000 troops would be withdrawn from 
~ast T1.mor. When t~e ~rst contingent of 400 left, foreign 
Journalists were femed m to ensure plenty of media cover-
age. The army claimed this would end the presence of 
combat troops and leave security in the hands of territorial 
troops focusing on construction and agricultural pursuits 
and even made the preposterous suggestion that the with-
drawn troops would be replaced by 800 army medical and 
'counselling personnel' and teachers. 
Th~ move was greeted with widespread cynicism in 
East T1mor. Troop rotation is a regular event and in any 
cas~, Jakarta always lies about the number of troops in the 
temtory. 
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Bishop Belo has been in the forefront of demands for 
Indonesian troops to be withdrawn. In June, he called for 
the withdrawal of all Indonesian troops. Ever since he took 
over as the apostolic administrator in 1983, he said, the 
army had claimed there were 200 guerrillas operating in 
East Tim or. The figure never went up or down. 'So why do 
we have to have all these battalions? It's surely enough to 
have 200 hansip (civil defence corps) to deal with them.' 
He also said he would be going to Jakarta to urge the 
armed forces commander, General Wiranto, to divulge the 
whereabouts of the victims of the Santa Cruz massacre and 
return the remains to the families. [Surya, 4 July] 
Release Xanana Gusmao! 
There is no question that Xanana Gusmao is in the very 
centre of all moves to resolve the issue of East Tim or. Pris-
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oner that he is, he is frequently interviewed and widely 
quoted in the Indonesian and international press. Visitors to 
his prison cell read like a Who's Who of the diplomatic 
corps and visiting foreign dignitaries. The Troika mission, 
in almost every paragraph of their conclusions, backed up 
their proposals by saying that Xanana had endorsed them. 
Indonesia is alone in still pigheadedly resisting the 
clamour. The Habibie government may think that their 
gestures will save them from making the only significant 
move that could break the deadlock. For the international 
solidarity movement and for the people of East Timor, 
Xanana's release is, more than ever before, the top priority.{{ 
An encounter with Gus Dur 
Little known to Western media, Abdurrahman Wahid heads the Nahdlatul Ulama, an Islamic group 
with 35million members, the largest Muslim group in the world. On a recent visit to East Timor for 
Radio Four's The World Tonight, Hugh O'Shaughnessy met him in Jakarta and found him trench-
ant in his views about what he acknowledges has been 'genocide 'in East Timor. This is his report. 
Abdurrahman Wahid sits in his sofa in an airy house on 
the edge of the Indonesian capital, surrounded by a respect-
ful gathering, as in the next room, a group of girls study the 
Koran. A slight figure, he is hampered by very bad eye-
sight, the result of an eye operation which went wrong. But 
his authority as a man - known as Gus Dur to his followers 
- who holds a tolerant reading of this religion, a sound but 
not excessive nationalism and a healthy distrust of some of 
the effects of globalisation on his country has tremendous 
influence in the world's most populous Muslim country. 
He feels, as many in East Timor feel, that the United 
Nations has to play a key role in the future of the former 
Portuguese colony. He thinks however that the opposition 
of Indonesian military chiefs will make the deployment of 
UN troops in East Timor a pipe dream for the moment. But 
he is keen that East Timorese cultural identity should be 
safeguarded with teaching being through the medium of 
Portuguese and Tetum, the native lingua franca. 'And the 
right people to take care of that is the Catholic Church,' he 
says firmly, adding, 'After hundreds of years of service, 
they know the East Timorese people very well.' 
The non-governmental organisations in Indonesia 
should, he argues, be given a leading part in fashioning the 
socio-economic future of East Timor, lest the big Indone-
sian companies dominate the territory and blot out the ini-
tiatives of the Timorese themselves. 
The UN should make sure that East Timor enjoys a to-
tally-decentralised status vis-a-vis Indonesia, with local 
legislatures acquiring an importance that they do not have 
now. 
Timorese oil 
We then turned to the start of the commercial exploita-
tion at the rate of 300,000 barrels a day of the oil found in 
East Timorese off-shore waters. This is being undertaken 
by Australian multinational Broken Hill, under an agree-
ment concluded in defiance of international law between 
the Australian and Indonesian authorities. 
' 
Gus Dur and Hugh O'Shaughnessy 
Abdurrahman Wahid said: 'I am not sure that I can stop 
this since it was negotiated by the military but the process 
of the internationalisation of East Timor must be slowed a 
bit.' 
On the question of the referendum on self-
determination that the East Timorese are .calling for, the 
Muslim leader argued that it would be impossible to stage 
at a time when tens of thousands of Indonesian troops were 
in the territory. 
Picking his words very carefully and opting for a term 
about Indonesian conduct that is seldom, if ever, heard 
from the lips of an Indonesian leader, he said that East 
Timorese and Indonesians should work together 'in stop-
ping the genocide'. 
Until there was a referendum on East Timor's future, he 
said, the government must be forced to be 'human to the 
Timorese'. 
Pending such a decision by the East Timorese on their 
future, he said, three aims had to be followed, the defence 
of East Timorese culture, the development of the territory 
in accordance with the needs of the area, and decentralisa-
tioo. * 
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BOOK REVIEW 
Jim Aubrey (Ed), Free East Timor, Australia's Cul-
pability in East Timor's Genocide, Vintage, NSW, 1998, 
296 pages. 
Torben Retboll (Ed), East Timor: Occupation and 
Resistance, IWGIA-Document No 89, Copenhagen, 
1998, 285 page. 
Miguel Faria de Bastos, Timor, the Biggest Extermi-
nation Camp in the World, published by the Portuguese 
Esperanto Society, Lisbon, 65 pages. 
What better proof do we need of worldwide solidarity 
with and concern for the continuing tragedy of East Timor 
than the appearance within months of each other of three 
books on East Timor? There was a time when books about 
East Timor were few and far between but that is no longer 
the case. 
The reader published by IWGIA (International Work 
Group for Indigenous Affairs) is its third publication on 
East Timor, each of which has been edited by the Danish 
academic Torben Retboll. The earlier ones appeared 
in 1980 and 1984. 
As before, Retboll has brought together chapters espe-
cially written, the reproduction of important writings and a 
number of documents of importance to activists and jour-
nalists. Part One includes a short article by Peter Carey on 
the history of the colonial power, Indonesia, followed by 
two chapters giving accounts of visits to East Tim or, before 
and after the invasion. Elaine Briere's chapter provides a 
warm and moving account of village life just eighteen 
months before the invasion. Her stunning photographs of 
the serenity of village life before the ravages of Indonesian 
might tore the country apart, have been used widely. Here 
she writes of how she and a colleague were captivated by 
the Timorese who took them into their embrace with such 
grace. Twenty years later, Michael Emin Salla found a 
country 'reeking with spies, informers and intelligence per-
sonnel'. 
Part Two deals with important events, the Balibo mur-
ders of foreign journalists written by Hugh Dowson, the 
Santa Cruz Massacre by photographer Steven Cox, the 
APEC Forum written by Retboll, and the Nobel Peace 
Prize lectures of Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta. 
Part Three deals with major themes like health, the en-
vironment, the Catholic church and East Timorese women. 
The most stimulating and original is the chapter by Milena 
Pires and Catherine Scott about East Timorese women 
which, while highlighting gender-related atrocities by In-
donesian soldiers, draws attention to the marginalisation of 
women in East Timorese society. 
The Epilogue is given over to a powerful condemnation 
by Noam Chomsky of Australian duplicity. Having in the 
early 1970s taken the lead in pushing for the adoption of 
the UN Declaration of Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations among States, Australia 
trampled on these principles to justify its decision to sign a 
deal with Indonesia to carve up oil resources belonging to 
the people of East Timor. 
What is lacking is an account of the solidarity move-
ment in Indonesia which certainly warrants a chapter writ-
ten by one of the many activists now campaigning so vig-
orously in Indonesia. 
For details on how to order this book from TAPOL, 
turn to page 1 8. 
Australian complicity exposed 
Jim Aubrey's excellent collection brings together some 
of the key documents about and writings by Australian 
activists exposing their government's betrayal of East 
Tim or. · 
The chapters include a full account of Ken Fry MP's 
two visits to East Timor in 1975 and his presentation to the 
UN General Assembly, along with correspondence from 
anonymous contacts, probably government officials, ex-
posing the policy of Andrew Peacock, the then foreign 
minister. Aubrey has also included the last article written 
by Roger East, the Australian journalist who chose to re-
main when all other Australians had been advise to leave 
East Timor just before the invasion. Roger was killed by 
firing squad on 7 December 1975. 
Rob Wesley-Smith, one of Australia's longest-serving 
East Timor activists, gives a graphic account of radio 
communications he and others maintained with the resis-
tance in East Timor during the early years of the war, the 
deliberate sabotaging of these communications by the 
Australian authorities and the sabotage of a mission organ-
ised by Rob to take medicine by sea to the isolated fighters 
in East Timor. 
Robert Domm 's path-breaking interview with Xanana 
Gusmao in September 1990 is reproduced in full, along 
with articles by John Pilger. 'A Land of Crosses', and by 
Russell Anderson who was an eye witness of the Santa 
Cruz massacre in November 1991. 
The Irish solidarity movement, ETISC, gave Australian 
Prime Minister Paul Keating a hard time when he paid a 
visit to Ireland to 'go back to his roots' . Keating was taken 
completely by surprise by the many protests that dogged 
him during what he had hoped would be an enjoyable 
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